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Following is a question by the Hon Steven Ho and a written reply by the Secretary for Security, Mr Lai Tung-kwok, in the Legislative Council today (October 28):
Question:
It has been reported that when a No.3 alarm fire broke out at Shau Kei Wan Typhoon Shelter (SKWTS) on the day of the Mid-Autumn Festival this year, the fireboat Elite, berthed at Central, arrived at the scene 26 minutes after the outbreak of fire, and the fireboat could enter the fire scene to battle the blaze only after coordination was made by the Marine Police. In the end, ten-odd vessels were destroyed by the fire. While the authorities claimed in 2013 that the time generally required for fireboats to arrive at SKWTS was eight minutes, it actually took 24 minutes and 16.2 minutes on average for fire vessels (i.e. fireboats and fire speedboats) of the Fire Services Department to arrive at SKWTS in the past two years respectively. Some political parties and fishermen associations have repeatedly requested the authorities to enhance marine fire-fighting measures and rescue strategies, and to plan afresh the berthing arrangements in typhoon shelters, but the authorities have turned a deaf ear to their requests. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) of the support measures that have been and will be provided by the authorities for the victims of the aforesaid fire; of the details and progress of such work, and the difficulties encountered;
(2) whether the authorities will provide support to the victims in meeting the costs of salvage of vessels which had sunk in the fire; whether they will exercise discretion and reduce the oil cleanup charges to be borne by the victims; whether they will streamline the relevant procedures so as to relieve the burden of the victims; if they will, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
(3) given that some victims relayed that at the early stage of the incident, there was no inter-departmental counterpart responsible for co-ordinating the follow-up work, and the victims felt worn out from running around different departments, whether the authorities will strengthen the liaison among various departments in handling such follow-up work in future so as to reduce the post-accident pressure faced by the victims; if they will, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
(4) whether the authorities will expeditiously take the following measures to improve their marine fire-fighting measures and rescue strategies: setting out target response times for fireboats to arrive at various typhoon shelters; deploying fireboats to station round the clock at typhoon shelters where fire hazards are high; stepping up fire safety publicity and educational efforts at the typhoon shelters; enhancing the fire safety awareness of fishermen and installing suitable fire service facilities at appropriate locations along the shore of or inside typhoon shelters, etc.; if they will, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
(5) of the current response times in general for the various fireboats and fire speedboats to arrive at various typhoon shelters or sea bays from their respective berths (set out in the Annex 1, and put a mark "/" for areas beyond the respective service areas of those vessels);
(6) whether the review of the berthing and sheltered space for local vessels being conducted by the Marine Department includes studies on increasing the numbers of berthing spaces for vessels and improving the demarcation of berthing spaces for different types of vessels, so as to avoid an increase in fire hazards due to overcrowding of vessels, and to prevent conflicts arising from berthing spaces being shared by different types of vessels (such as fishing vessels and yachts); if it does, of the details and when the authorities will publish the findings of the studies; if not, the reasons for that; and
(7) given that some fishermen relayed to me that, in order to cater for the development of the fishing industry, they had purchased fishing vessels with lengths exceeding the overall permitted lengths set for the typhoon shelters at which they intend to berth their vessels and they are therefore required to regularly obtain permission from the Marine Department for their vessels to enter or stay at the typhoon shelters concerned, and such a requirement has left quite a number of fishing vessels with no alternative but to berth outside the typhoon shelters or at faraway typhoon shelters, which have seriously affected the delivery of catch by fishermen and the provision of replenishment for their fishing vessels, whether the authorities will conduct a comprehensive review of the length limits for vessels permitted to enter various typhoon shelters, so as to meet the needs for the development of the local fishing industry and avoid causing inconvenience to the operations and daily lives of the fishermen, as well as prevent such length limits from bringing about additional fire hazards?
Reply:
President,
A No.3 alarm vessel fire broke out at Shau Kei Wan Typhoon Shelter (SKWTS) in the afternoon of September 27 this year. After receiving a fire report involving fishing vessels at 2.01pm that day, the Fire Services Communications Centre (FSCC) immediately turned out two fireboats (namely Fireboat No.1, which was berthed at Central Fireboat Station and was the closest to the scene of incident at the time; and Fireboat No.4, which was berthed at Aberdeen Fireboat Station), one diving support vessel and one diving support speedboat, together with five major fire appliances on land direct to the scene.
Upon arriving at SKWTS at 2.07pm (i.e. six minutes from the time of call), the land crews boarded a police launch with fire-fighting equipment and set off for the scene for fire-fighting and rescue operation. Fireboat No.1 and the diving support vessel also arrived on the scene at 2.27pm (i.e. 26 minutes from the time of call). As many vessels were leaving the typhoon shelter at that time to avoid being affected by the fire and were clustering at the waters near the access to the typhoon shelter, the vessels of the Fire Services Department (FSD) had to cautiously cruise through the dense cluster of vessels at a safe speed when entering the typhoon shelter. Moreover, when cruising inside the typhoon shelter, fire vessels had to take heed of vessels berthing at or navigating inside the typhoon shelter to keep a safe distance from other vessels so as to avoid collision.
In general, upon receiving a fire call relating to vessels in Hong Kong waters, FSCC will, having regard to the circumstances, despatch the fireboats and fire speedboats nearest the incident scene to handle the fire. In addition, the nearby on-shore fire stations will deploy fire appliances to provide speedy support. The actual time taken for fire vessels to arrive on the scene of marine fire is affected by various factors, for example, the location of relevant vessels at the time of call; whether the vessels are engaged in other operations (including participation in regular navigation training, exercise and inspection, or handling other emergency incidents); the marine traffic at the time; waves and tides; visibility, etc. As such, the response time varies on each occasion.
My reply to the seven parts of the question, in consultation with relevant bureaux and departments, is as follows:
(1) and (3) On the day of the incident, the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) contacted the owners of the affected fishing vessels to learn about the situation, and assisted the fishermen in need to apply for the Emergency Relief Fund and the Fish Marketing Organization Loan Fund for repairing or replacing their damaged vessels. AFCD is processing the relevant applications, and will continue to keep in contact with the affected owners to assist them in resuming fishing operation as soon as possible. The Marine Department (MD) has received damage reports of 29 local vessels in the incident. For vessel owners in need of assistance, MD has verified their identities, assessed the extent of damage of their vessels, and assisted them in making applications to relevant departments or authorities for relevant financial assistance, so as to tide over the difficult times.
On the other hand, in accordance with the departmental operation manual of emergency response and relief services in the event of natural disasters, the Eastern District Office (EDO) set up an inter-departmental help desk immediately at the ground floor of the Eastern Law Courts Building, which was nearest the fire scene on the day of fire. In addition to the staff from EDO, the help desk comprised members from the Social Welfare Department (SWD), the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF), FSD, MD and the Lands Department. At the help desk, personal details and practical needs of those affected by the fire were registered so that departments concerned could take follow-up support actions. EDO also provided emergency financial assistance to the families affected by the fire through the General Chinese Charities Fund. SWD referred five families to an Integrated Family Service Centre for follow-up services, and helped another family with financial difficulty to apply for Comprehensive Social Security Assistance.
(2) In general, in the event that a local vessel is in distress at sea, the Director of Marine may, according to section 56 of the Merchant Shipping (Local Vessels) Ordinance (Cap. 548), give the owner of the vessel which is stranded, abandoned or sunk in the waters of Hong Kong such directions as he thinks fits in respect of the removal, movement and so on of the vessel. The oil spillage so involved will be cleaned up by MD. For this incident, MD has already cleaned up the oil spillage at scene according to the established procedures. As regards the salvage and disposal of the damaged vessels, a number of owners have applied to MD to surrender their vessels as they have difficulty in dealing with their disposal. Having regard to the circumstances of the incident and the difficulties encountered by these owners, MD has exercised its discretion to arrange for the salvage and disposal of the wrecks for the owners at no charge.
(4) As I have pointed out in my reply to the Honourable Ho's question at the meeting of this Council on June 24 this year, FSD reviews from time to time its overall marine firefighting and rescue strategies in Hong Kong as well as the related equipment. FSD conducts risk assessment for different water areas, taking into account factors including the distribution of vessels, the utilisation of shipping channels, the existence of high risk facilities at sea and along coastal areas etc., in deciding the location of fireboat stations and deployment of fire vessels (i.e. fireboats and fire speedboats). On whether a fireboat would be deployed at a particular typhoon shelter, it depends on whether the concerned shelter is at a strategic location within that water area, and whether the shelter is a suitable berthing location for the fireboat, for example, whether the shelter is sufficiently deep, and whether a suitable site is available in the vicinity for the construction of berthing facilities for fireboats.
Regarding the concern raised by the Honourable Ho on the response time of fire vessels, there is no standard response time for marine fire calls in Hong Kong, nor any internationally prescribed standard response time. The berthing of vessels at sea is not the same as the distribution of buildings on land. For example, vessels in larger sea areas are more widely spread and of higher mobility. Unlike the land area, there is no risk category for the marine area as reference for making regular specific risk assessments. Therefore, it is difficult to set an appropriate response time and performance pledge for individual areas of waters. That said, FSD will assess potential fire risks from time to time and flexibly deploy existing resources to strategic positions according to the overall risk of different areas of waters and inshore installations, and will put in place appropriate operational arrangements to meet the demand of individual areas or during special periods so as to respond to potential emergency incidents.
During peak seasons including the fishing moratorium and important festive periods, fishing vessels return to berth at typhoon shelters. The fire risks of the typhoon shelters may consequently increase as fishing vessels are densely anchored therein. FSD will therefore step up patrol along the shipping channels within the shelters, and conduct fire drills in the shelters before the fishing moratorium and the Lunar New Year every year in collaboration with HKPF and MD, so as to enhance the efficiency in fire-fighting and rescue operations and strengthen the co-ordination among relevant departments in response to marine fires.
On publicity and public education, FSD will organise thematic talks on fire prevention through fishermen groups, MD and various District Offices. These talks aim to remind fishermen of the precautions when using and maintaining electrical installations on vessels and to teach them the correct way to use a fire extinguisher etc. FSD will also broadcast messages about vessel fire protection and distribute fire safety publicity leaflets for vessels during the periods, with a view to enhancing the fire safety awareness of fishermen.
FSD has considered the suggestion of providing fixed fire service installations (FSI) on the shore of typhoon shelters. However, the fire-fighting capability of FSI at fixed locations can only cover a small number of vessels since vessels are not berthed at fixed locations and are dispersed throughout the typhoon shelters. These installations are therefore considered not effective in enhancing the fire safety standard of typhoon shelters. Even if fixed FSI and other emergency equipment were installed at berthing points and on the shore of typhoon shelters, such equipment should only be operated upon the arrival of the fire personnel and appliances on land in the event of fire or other emergency incidents. When fire appliances arrive directly at the coastal locations nearest the scene, on-board monitors can be used as fire-fighting equipment. Furthermore, the installation of FSI with high pressure such as monitors on land could cause danger to the public if they were used by people without professional training. In contrast, fire appliances equipped with monitors can be deployed more flexibly to specifically target at the location of the vessel on fire and facilitate fire-fighting operations effectively. That said, FSD is actively considering the addition of fire-fighting equipment, such as portable fire pumps, at fire stations near typhoon shelters to enhance the land crews' fire-fighting capability and flexibility in the typhoon shelters.
(5) The time generally required for various fireboats and fire speedboats of FSD to arrive at various typhoon shelters or bays within their main service areas from their respective berths is set out at Annex 2.
(6) and (7) MD is conducting a fundamental review on berthing and sheltered space for local vessels, and is comprehensively assessing the supply and demand of typhoon shelter space for local vessels. The review will look into the established mechanism for provision of sheltered space and the challenges faced, including operational requirements such as the demarcation of berthing spaces according to vessel types and the overall permitted lengths of vessels set for various typhoon shelters. So far, the consultant engaged by MD has preliminarily completed a large-scale survey on berthing and sheltered space arrangements for local vessels. Data analysis is being conducted and upon completion, MD will work together with representatives of the relevant departments and the trade to draw up feasible improvement proposals, having regard to the outcomes of the data analysis and practical circumstances. Relevant stakeholders, such as the Local Vessels Advisory Committee and the Harbourfront Commission, will be consulted. The review is expected to be completed in mid-2016.
Ends/Wednesday, October 28, 2015
Issued at HKT 18:30
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