LCQ10: Aviation fuel facility in Tuen Mun
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    Following is a question by the Hon Albert Ho and a written reply by the Secretary for Economic Development and Labour, Mr Stephen Ip, in the Legislative Council today (March 7):

Question:

     Regarding the Airport Authority Hong Kong ("AA")'s proposal to build a permanent aviation fuel facility ("AFF") in Tuen Mun, will the Government inform this Council:

(a) of the respective maximum permissible and current average numbers of flights taking off and landing at the Hong Kong International Airport each hour;

(b) whether it knows:

(i) the total capacity of the existing AFF, as well as the storage level of aviation fuel at the AFF at the end of each month and its consumption level of that month since January 2003;

(ii) the AA's specific justifications for the conclusion that the existing AFF will only be able to support the demand for aviation fuel to 2009; and

(iii) if there have been cases of the supply of aviation fuel falling short of its demand since January 2003; if so, of the details; if not, of the AA's justifications for its view that there is an urgent need to build a new AFF;

(c) given that a report submitted to the Court of Final Appeal last year points out that in case of a catastrophic incident occurring at the new AFF, the lives of the more than 200 staff in the steel mill adjacent to the new AFF will be in jeopardy, how the Government ensures the safety of these staff;

(d) given that high temperature and combustion work processes (such as cutting disused tyres) will be carried out in the EcoPark next to the new AFF, how the Government can ensure that the safety of the staff in the EcoPark will not be threatened as a result of an incident occurring at the new AFF; and

(e) given that the relevant Environmental Impact Assessment Report acknowledges that lightning is a relatively common ignition source for tank fires and a tanker was struck by lightning after unloading at Tsing Yi Island in 1997, and that a large amount of steel which can conduct electricity is stored in the steel mill adjacent to the new AFF, whether the Government has information on the average frequency of lightning occurring in each month in New Territories West, and whether it has assessed the risks posed by lightning to the new AFF?

Reply:

Madam President,

(a) The current maximum number of aircraft movements at the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) is about 54 per hour.  The total number of aircraft movements in a typical day is about 780, i.e. an average of about 33 movements per hour.

(b)(i) The current capacity of the fuel tanks at the HKIA is 172 000 m3. The inventory and consumption at HKIA since January 2003 are tabled as attached.

(ii)&(iii) The supply of aviation fuel to Hong Kong relies on sea transport, and is susceptible to interruptions by factors such as inclement weather.  To ensure its smooth operation, HKIA must have a sufficient fuel reserve, supported by a fuel receiving facility with enough capacity to meet the basic demand of day-to-day airport operation and to replenish any depletion of reserve promptly in the event that supply disruption does take place.

     The existing receiving facility at Sha Chau (This receiving facility is intended to be a temporary one because it is located within the Sha Chau and Lung Kwu Chau Marine Park, and the shallow water depth limits access to small tankers only.  Expansion of the receiving capacity of this facility is not possible.) has a capacity of 16 800 m3 per day or about 510 000 m3 per month.  As shown in the table above, the fuel consumption for the last three months of 2006 has already reached that level.  The existing fuel reserve capacity (172 000 m3, equivalent to just over 10 days of consumption in peak seasons) also falls short of providing a sufficient cushion against supply disruption.  

     Given the forecast robust growth in air traffic, the Airport Authority (AA) has already implemented all possible stop-gap measures, including the enhancement of backup receiving facility to provide additional capacity of 3 000 m3 per day, and construction of new fuel tanks to provide additional storage capacity of 51 000 m3  on the airport island (Building more fuel tanks on the airport island would not be useful as fuel supply is still constrained by the limited receiving capacity and shallow water surrounding the airport island.)  Despite these stop-gap measures, the Airport Authority (AA) estimates that from around 2009 the capacity of available fuel receiving and storage facilities would not be able to provide the cushion required to ensure continual operation of HKIA in the event of fuel supply disruption.  As the construction of the Permanent Aviation Fuel Facility (PAFF) takes about three years, there is therefore an urgent need to begin construction work as soon as possible.

(c), (d) & (e) AA is committed to maintaining a high level of safety for PAFF.  According to information provided by AA, the design and construction of PAFF will comply with all applicable local statutory requirements and international standards.  Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) commissioned by AA, the results of which have been included in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report, show that the risk of catastrophic failure of the fuel tanks is extremely low and all risks associated with PAFF are well within the acceptable level specified in the Technical Memorandum under the EIA Ordinance (Cap. 499).  

     The aviation fuel to be stored at PAFF (namely Jet A1 fuel) is far less hazardous than other types of fuel such as gasoline because Jet A1 fuel does not generally produce flammable vapour which is a major source of fire or explosion risks.  Historical records also show that catastrophic tank failures were mostly related to the use of tank construction materials that could become brittle (hence increasing the risk of rupture) at very low ambient temperatures.  PAFF tanks do not use such materials and the temperature in Hong Kong is much higher.

     Furthermore, PAFF tanks will be surrounded by a sunken bund with containment capacity well exceeding applicable international standards to contain fuel spillage.  Compared with the common worldwide practice of using a single bund wall and fence, PAFF will have two additional impervious security walls and a landscape bund to further reduce any risk to parties outside its perimeter.

     Taking into account the effects of potential ignition sources outside PAFF, including those in the adjacent steel mill and the neighbouring EcoPark, the QRAs estimate that in the worst case scenario (instantaneous loss of 100% of the tank's content) the risks to individual employees of the steel mill and the EcoPark would be approximately 10-9 incident per year ( For comparison, an individual's risk of death in a traffic accident is about 10-4 incident per year, which is 100,000 times higher.)  The residual risks to people off-site are extremely small and well controlled by the design of PAFF.

     According to the data of the Hong Kong Observatory, the monthly average frequency of lightning in the New Territory West region in 2006 is about 160 per 100 square kilometre per month, which is comparable to that of the New Territory East.

     The possibility of ignition due to lightning strike is included in the assessed tank fire frequencies and addressed in the EIA process.  PAFF tanks will be designed against static, stray currents and lightning according to the relevant international standard.  Given the distance between the steel mill and PAFF, the existence of the steel mill is expected to have very little effect on the frequency of lightning strikes on a PAFF tank.  Furthermore, the small effect arising from the presence of the steel mill is expected to reduce, not increase, the frequency of lightning strikes on a PAFF tank because the steel mill building, like a lightning rod, will attract lightning that might otherwise strike other structures in the vicinity.

     Other key safety measures of PAFF include:

- spacing between the tanks and the PAFF site boundary (minimum 28.5m) significantly exceeding the requirement under the relevant Hong Kong standard (10m) and also the requirements of the relevant international standards (varying from 7.25m to 21.75m);

- state of the art fire fighting systems, such as fixed base foam injection, shell cooling systems on the tanks and remotely operated foam monitors;

- emergency shut down valves with multiple means of actuation including both manual and automatic systems; and

- double security fencing, CCTVs and security guards on 24 hours duty.

     The EIA report prepared by the Airport Authority is available for public inspection under the EIA Ordinance from February 23 to March 24, 2007. It will also be presented to the Advisory Council on the Environment for advice before April 26, 2007.

Ends/Wednesday, March 7, 2007
Issued at HKT 16:05

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