LCQ13:Improvement measures to enhance responses to fire incidents in tunnels

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Following is a question by the Hon Lau Kong-wah and a written reply by the Acting Secretary for Transport, Mr Kevin Ho, in the Legislative Council today (June 14):

Question : It was reported that there had been delays in the rescue and evacuation operations in response to an incident on May 29, in which a private car caught fire inside a tube of the Cross Harbour Tunnel. Regarding the contingency arrangements for the outbreak of fires inside vehicle tunnels, will the Government inform this Council :

(a) of the details of the rescue and evacuation operations for that particular incident, including the respective response times of the tunnel company staff and firemen, and whether it has assessed if there are aspects which require improvements; if it has, of the details;

(b) whether the location of that incident is within the range of coverage of the closed circuit television ("CCTV") system of the tunnel company; whether it knows if the CCTV systems of other vehicle tunnels can cover the entire tubes; and whether it is necessary to extend the range of coverage of these CCTV systems; and

(c) whether the fire extinguishing installations inside various vehicle tunnels are sufficient to cope with various types of fires, including those caused by vehicles loaded with inflammable substances or fuelled by liquefied petroleum gas?

Reply :

Madam President,

According to the report submitted by the Cross Harbour Tunnel operator to the Transport Department (TD), the control room staff of the tunnel operator detected at 1325 hours on May 29, 2000 via the closed circuit television (CCTV) that there was smoke in the Kowloon bound tube. They immediately activated the standard fire emergency procedures, including informing the Fire Services Department (FSD) through the direct telephone line, dispatching the first rescue team to the incident scene, stopping vehicular traffic into the tunnel, alerting the tunnel users of the emergency situation, switching on the fire mode of the ventilation system and opening the emergency gate to facilitate the fire engines to access the incident scene.

The tunnel operator advised that their first rescue team arrived at the scene at 1328 hours and found that a private car was on fire. They attempted to control the fire, but failed. As fire officers were arriving, they proceeded to evacuate drivers and passengers in the tunnel. Majority of the tunnel users were evacuated by 1337 hours.

In addition to the call from the tunnel operator, FSD received a 999 call on the fire at 1324 hours. FSD arrived at the tunnel portal at 1328 hours and the fire scene at 1330 hours. The fire was suppressed at 1356 hours.

Having reviewed the incident, the Administration considers that the tunnel operator had responded and handled the fire incident generally in an effective manner and in accordance with established procedures. However, there are several areas on which we will work with the tunnel operator to improve. It took two minutes for the tunnel staff at the control room to detect the fire. The fire should have been detected as early as possible. The tunnel operator's staff reportedly took three minutes to reach the incident scene. The two rescue staff who arrived at the scene first had not complied with standard procedures on four aspects. Firstly, they did not wear smoke masks when entering the scene. Secondly, they used a fire extinguisher instead of a fire hose to control the fire. Thirdly, one member of the staff left the scene to help with evacuation, but should have stayed to work as a team. Fourthly, both members of the staff should have stayed at the scene to hand over the operation to the fire officers on their arrival. Failure to follow standard procedures may put the staff at risk.

We had identified several improvement measures. Firstly, the tunnel operator had been asked to enhance staff training in fire emergencies. Secondly, improvement in communication and evacuation of passengers especially for the bus passengers would be required. TD will shortly co-ordinate a fire drill in the tunnel with participation from the FSD, the Police and the bus operators. Thirdly, the CCTV monitoring system, built some 28 year ago, should be upgraded to enhance monitoring capability at the tunnel control room.

We are also looking into further improvement measures to enhance responses to fire incidents in tunnels. They will include a review of the need for upgrading of equipment in Government tunnels; better planning and closer monitoring of fire drills and organising more experience sharing sessions among the tunnel operators to review performance and the latest development in emergency management in the industry. We will also step up education for the public on safety guidelines in case of fire and other emergencies inside tunnels with the assistance of the tunnel operators, bus companies and the Road Safety Council.

The entire tube of the Cross Harbour Tunnel, including the location of the incident, is covered by the CCTV system of the Tunnel. The CCTV systems of all other tunnels cover the entire tubes.

The fire fighting installations including the fire extinguishers, fire hydrants and ventilation systems in all tunnels in Hong Kong fully complied with FSD's requirements and are maintained by registered Fire Service Installation Contractors annually. They are considered adequate to cope with fire incidents in tunnels including those involving vehicles fuelled by liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). The staff of all tunnels have also been trained to handle fire incidents involving LPG-fuelled vehicles. Emergency handling procedures on LPG vehicles have also been drawn up by FSD and Electrical and Mechanical Services Department for all parties concerned, including drivers and tunnel staff, to make reference and to observe. Vehicles carrying dangerous goods of Category 1, 2 or 5 are banned from using all tunnels in Hong Kong under the relevant tunnel legislation.

End/Wednesday, June 14, 2000

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