LCQ16: Fire incident at the Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1
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Question:
A No.3 alarm fire broke out at the Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1 (I.PARK1) on October 26, 2026. The waste originally destined for I.PARK1 has to be diverted to the West New Territories Landfill Extension for disposal. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) of the respective monthly municipal solid waste (MSW) treatment capacity of I.PARK1 since the commencement of the first phase of trial operation in December 2025; given that the three incineration modules of I.PARK1 will commence trial operation in phases, of the average daily tonnage of MSW treated at the three incineration modules in each phase;
(2) of the damage and cause of the fire at I.PARK1; of the estimated time required for the contractor to conduct repairs; which party will bear the relevant repair costs;
(3) given that according to the Government press release, regarding the third module area where the fire originated, the Environmental Protection Department is conducting a detailed assessment of the damage and its impact on the facility, and will urge the contractor to formulate a recovery plan and conduct repairs as soon as possible, of the latest progress to date;
(4) given the Government's earlier target for I.PARK1 to achieve full operation within 2026, processing 3 000 tonnes of MSW daily, whether the fire incident will affect its implementation of the said target; and
(5) how the Government will draw on the experience gained from the fire incident to safeguard and enhance the safety standards of waste management facilities during the construction and operational phases?
Reply:
President,
The Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1 (I.PARK1), located on an artificial island off Shek Kwu Chau, has commenced its first phase of trial operation since December 2025. The three incineration modules have progressively undergone system testing and trial operation during 2026 as planned, and on October 23, the facility substantially reached the designed treatment capacity of 3 000 tonnes of municipal solid waste (MSW) per day.
At approximately 12.40pm on October 26, 2026, a fire broke out in the area of the third incineration module of the I.PARK1 incineration building. It was largely put out at about 4.45pm the same day.
Following the incident, the facility's contractor immediately took action in accordance with its emergency response protocol. This included reporting to the Fire Services Department (FSD), controlling the fire by trained designated response personnel, orderly evacuating about 970 construction workers and operational staff on the island and suspending the operation of all major systems. To ensure that waste treatment services remain unaffected, the Environmental Protection Department (EPD) co-ordinated the diversion of MSW originally destined for disposal at I.PARK1 to the West New Territories Landfill Extension. Hong Kong's overall waste treatment operations currently remain normal.
After comprehensively examining all major systems of the facility's first and second incineration modules, the EPD confirmed that the modules were safe and suitable for restarting, and have gradually resumed operation since October 30 to continue system testing and trial operation.
In consultation with the Security Bureau and the FSD, the consolidated reply to the questions raised by the Hon Chan Siu-hung is as follows:
(1) The three incineration modules of I.PARK1 commenced system testing and trial operation in December 2025, March 2026 and July 2026 respectively. To date, they have treated approximately 390 000 tonnes of MSW, with the average daily treatment volume progressively increasing to about 1 900 tonnes in October 2026. Owing to the engineering and testing requirements of the major systems of each module, the monthly treatment volume may fluctuate, but the overall trend has remained steadily upward. From December 2025 to October 25, 2026 (i.e. before the fire incident), the average daily MSW treatment volumes of the three incineration modules during each stage of system testing and trial operation are tabulated below:
| Stage | Months covered | Average daily treatment volume (tonnes) |
| Phase 1 | December 2025 to February 2026 | 658.6 |
| Phase 2 | March 2026 to June 2026 | 1 090.4 |
| Phase 3 | July 2026 to October 25, 2026 | 1 667.7 |
(2), (3) and (4) The fire in this incident originated at the rooftop area/near the rooftop area of the third module of the incineration building, where welding and other finishing works were still in progress. The FSD has completed its investigation, which involved collecting evidence at the scene and taking statements from relevant parties. Findings indicated that the fire originated on the upper level within the third incineration module area of the incineration building of the I.PARK1. The investigation has ruled out electrical faults, arson and spontaneous combustion of chemical substances as the cause of the fire, which is instead suspected to be related to welding works or smoking.
On the impact to the facility, the area affected by the fire was confined to the third module of the incineration building of the facility. The two adjacent modules, the waste storage bunkers and the unloading hall remained unaffected. The preliminary assessment by the Registered Structural Engineer engaged by the contractor confirmed that there was no imminent danger to the building structure.
The fire mainly affected the upper-levels and rooftop areas of the third module of the incineration building, including the aluminium cladding on the roof sheets, structural steel components supporting the roof as well as the ventilation system, air ducts and piping. The incineration system components located in the middle-levels of the third module building area were only slightly affected. The contractor and the Registered Structural Engineer are conducting detailed assessments and testing of the rooftop section of the third module, as well as the incineration, flue gas treatment, electrical, mechanical and fire services systems and equipment, to formulate and implement a recovery plan, and ensure a safe working environment for workers to carry out clearance and other follow-up work. The completion date for the repair works cannot yet be ascertained. The EPD has instructed the contractor to expedite all repair works, while ensuring safety and quality of works, with a view to resuming the testing of the third module and achieving full operation of the facility as soon as possible.
I.PARK1 was originally scheduled to achieve full operation in 2026. Its overall construction works (including the incineration, seawater desalination, sewage treatment, power generation and electricity supply systems) were substantially completed earlier, and testing of relevant systems had been proceeding as planned. Due to the impact of the fire incident to the third incineration module, the targetted timeframe for full operation of I.PARK1 is expected to be postponed. The actual schedule will be determined after the contractor has completed the detailed assessments and tests, and implemented the rehabilitation plan.
According to the contract terms of the I.PARK1, the contractor is responsible for the repair works if any damage occurs before the facility enters formal operation. In accordance with the requirements for government public works, the contractor has procured Contractor's All Risks Insurance which covers losses to structural works, materials, and electrical and mechanical equipment arising from accidents such as fire.
(5) The EPD places great emphasis on the safety standards of the waste management facilities under its purview and strictly oversees contractors' implementation of various safety and fire prevention management measures through multi-pronged approach. In terms of regular supervision, the EPD carries out regular site safety inspections and holds safety meetings jointly with resident site staff and contractors. It also meets with contractors' management to press for strict compliance with the latest legislation and guidelines, so as to ensure a safe construction and operational environment. In addition, the EPD actively promotes a safety culture. In May 2026, it held a sharing session focusing on safe construction and operation to share industry's best practices and safety recommendations with contractors and promote safety management. The contractors of all facilities have implemented a series of safety measures, including enforcing a hot work permit system, enhancing worker training and imposing site-wide smoking ban, to mitigate fire risks on site.
The aforementioned fire incident demonstrated that the fire service installations at I.PARK1 and the various contingency measures adopted by the contractor, such as establishing an on-site fire response team and personnel evacuation procedures performed as intended. Nevertheless, following the incident, the EPD immediately followed up and strengthened relevant measures, including requiring contractors of all EPD facilities to immediately conduct comprehensive inspections and maintenance of fire service installations and equipment, arrange fire prevention training and emergency drills, enhancing fire risk management, and reiterating the requirement for strict enforcement of the hot work permit system, site safety and fire prevention management, as well as comprehensive site-wide smoking ban. All contractors are currently implementing these requirements. The EPD will hold another sharing session on safe construction and operation in November 2026 to raise awareness of construction and operational safety among contractors and their staff.
In response to the FSD's investigation findings on the cause of the fire, the EPD has instructed the I.PARK1 contractor to immediately review and strengthen the measures to eliminate fire risks, specifically targeting the handling of hot works (including welding) and further tightening the site-wide smoking ban. To enforce the site-wide smoking ban, the I.PARK1 contractor has implemented corresponding measures since January 2026, including requiring workers to deposit cigarettes and lighters in cigarette racks at the pier before boarding the I.PARK1 artificial island, conducting regular and surprise inspections and holding regular fire safety and smoking cessation talks. If any worker is found smoking on site, the contractor will immediately order the worker to leave the site and be removed from the I.PARK1 project. If cigarette butts or cigarette packs are found in an area under subcontractor's purview, the subcontractor will be liable to a fine of $3,000 per cigarette. The contractor also conducts half yearly safety performance assessments of subcontractors, including compliance with the site-wide smoking ban. Those failing to meet the standard are barred from bidding for the contractor's projects. From January 2026 to date, the contractor ordered nine workers found smoking on site be removed from the I.PARK1 project and penalised subcontractors 59 times, with fines totalling approximately $810,000. The contractor is currently exploring further measures to enforce the smoking ban more strictly. In addition, the EPD has referred cases of non-compliance occurred after the legislation of comprehensive smoking-ban on construction sites took effect to the Labour Department for follow-up.
The EPD is reviewing the incident to further strengthen contingency measures and enhance the safety operation level of the facility. Relevant best practices will be promoted to other facilities under the EPD's purview to ensure construction and operational safety.
Ends/Wednesday, November 18, 2026
Issued at HKT 13:10
Issued at HKT 13:10
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