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Securitisation and its impact on financial stability
The Asian economies are not necessarily immune to the current turbulence in the US and European money markets.
Banks need capital to do business, and banking supervisors have laid
down capital adequacy ratios (CAR) and other supervisory measures to
ensure that the banks have enough capital to support the risks they
take using depositors' money. These measures constrain the ability
of the banks, particularly those with CAR near the regulatory
minimum, to expand their business. It is therefore natural for the
banks to try to do more business with less capital in an effort to
make more profits for their shareholders.
One
popular way of doing so is to securitise assets that would normally
be booked on the balance sheets of the banks, through the creation
of asset-backed securities (ABS) or, in the case of mortgages,
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This can be done by the banks
themselves, or by so-called conduits or special investment vehicles
(SIV) buying the assets from the banks, packaging and slicing them
to suit the risk appetite of investors. The banks are then able to
use the capital released to do other business, while at the same
time earning fee income from continuing to service the securitised
assets or underwriting the securities, and trading income from
making a market in the securities. The securities issued by the
conduits and SIVs to fund the purchase of assets from the banks may
take different forms, such as the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP).
These are of short-term maturity and therefore not a stable source
of funding, and so the banks provide, for a fee, the SIVs with
back-up credit lines (these do not need to be supported by capital
under Basel I) and credit enhancement support to help attain a high,
possibly AAA, rating for the ABCP from the rating agencies.
Like
a factory, the financial system of the developed market originates
assets (such as mortgages); warehouses them; packages them, with or
without slicing, creates ABS of all sorts, possibly mixing them with
other financial assets and turning them into other forms such as
collateralised debt obligations (CDO); and distributes them to
investors including banks, pension funds and hedge funds all over
the world. The financial system is so efficient at doing this that
quite a lot of people take things for granted and few questions are
asked. Why worry about the quality of these assets if they will be
off-loaded to somebody else anyway? Let us get those conveyer belts
moving more quickly, do more business, charge more fees for those
back-up credit lines and credit enhancement support that require
little or no capital, earn more income from trading the paper, and
make more profits. Sub-prime mortgages? No problem. They will be
off the balance sheet quickly. In any case, they are good assets,
given ever-increasing property prices. If we do not do this, others
will. The rating agencies are happy with the asset quality, aren¡¦t
they? If not, they can be packaged with better assets and lumped
into that big pool of diversified assets backing the issue of the
next CDO. On and on it goes.
Until, as we saw earlier in the year, weakness in the housing market
in the US led to a jump in the delinquency rate of sub-prime
mortgages, leading to the following sequence of events:
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Downgrades of ratings of sub-prime-mortgage-backed
securities |
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Growing concern among investors about potential risk
exposures |
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Sharp widening of spreads in many structured products (MBS,
ABS, CDO, ABCP) |
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Disorderly re-pricing of risks |
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Loss of confidence in the rating system of structured
products |
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Difficulty in pricing the structured products and depleted
liquidity |
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Conduits not able to roll over the ABCP and needing to draw
on back-up credit lines from banks |
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Assets underlying the structured products returning onto
the balance sheets of banks ¡V a process known as re-intermediation |
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A marked rise in perceived risks faced by banks and loss of
confidence in the interbank market |
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Tightness remaining even when central banks provided
liquidity support. |
It
is not clear when this turmoil in the money markets in the US and
Europe will subside or whether monetary policy shifts may help.
Interestingly, so far the contagious effects on emerging markets
have been muted, presumably because financial innovation through
securitisation has not taken hold as much as in the developed
markets, given that the capital cushions of domestic banks in
emerging markets in Asia, in excess of the regulatory requirements,
are large. However, there is a risk that prolonged credit tightness
may have adverse implications for the economy and asset prices in
the developed markets, ultimately affecting the global economy.
Joseph Yam
4 October 2007
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