|
"Hong
Kong – New Opportunities as an International Financial Centre"
Mr
Joseph Yam, GBS, JP
Chief Executive
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
HKETO
Seminar
Tokyo
8 May
2007
1.
Let me first thank you for giving me the honour of speaking
to you today on a subject that is of enormous importance to Hong Kong –
the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Many of
you may already be aware that the maintenance of Hong Kong as an
international financial centre is a requirement laid down in the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China. It is unusual for a policy of this kind to
be written into a constitutional document. But there are sound
historical reasons for doing so; and I will not go into them today. I
draw your attention to this legal requirement merely to underline the
strong commitment to this policy regarding Hong Kong by the People’s
Republic of China and the seriousness with which we in Hong Kong take
this policy.
2.
And I am happy to be discussing this subject with you today
in the context of the tenth anniversary of China’s resumption in
the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong. The past ten years have
been eventful, particularly in financial affairs, for both the Mainland
and Hong Kong. They included, of course, the Asian financial crisis,
which had consequences that took quite a few years to sort out. During
this decade China has also continued with great confidence in its
challenging programme of reform and liberalisation. This programme has
placed a clear emphasis on financial development, very much in
accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that “finance is the nucleus of a
modern economy”. As China’s international financial centre, Hong Kong
has both participated in and benefited from this process. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government has recently developed a
strategy to help position Hong Kong in the best possible way in this
process: it is this strategy that I would like to focus on in my talk
today.
3.
Let me begin with the principle of "one country, two
systems". It is natural that the political and governance
dimensions first spring to mind whenever this term is mentioned. But
there is a lot more to it. The one country, China, embraces two
economic systems - one, described as the socialist, market economy of
the Mainland, the other the capitalist, free market economy of Hong
Kong. China also maintains two financial systems – one on the Mainland,
which is relatively closed yet developing, and the other in Hong Kong,
which is rather more open, developed, competitive and efficient, by
virtue of its long history of market freedom. There are also two
educational systems, two transport systems, two social systems, two
legal systems, and so on.
4.
This arrangement is quite unique. Other countries may have
their own regional variations in governance and economy, but I am not
aware of any where the differences are so pronounced, or offer such
opportunities. What this unique arrangement means, very simply, is that
China has two financial systems to serve its needs. There are
considerable differences between the two financial systems, given their
different histories, even to the extent that different currencies are
used. We all know that differences present choices for the
users, and differences enable relative strengths to be exploited,
relative weaknesses to be addressed and synergies to be maximised in the
national interest. However, financial controls, for example, those on
the Mainland relating to international capital flows, which are
justified by special circumstances, do limit the freedom to choose. And
so complete reliance on the free market in the making of rational
choices of which system to use in the provision of financial services is
not possible; nor is complete reliance on the free market in the
associated maximisation of comparative advantages and specialisation
between the two systems. Realistically, these will need to be achieved
by the creation of special channels to facilitate the mobility of funds,
financial instruments and financial institutions between the two
systems, and the architecture of the special channels designed to suit
the special circumstances of the Mainland.
5.
I am happy to say that there is now increasing recognition
of the need for these special, financial mobility channels or, put
simply, the need for strengthening the co-operative relationship between
the two financial systems within the country. Let me refer to the
statements made by Premier Wen on 19 January this year at the
National Finance Working Meeting held in Beijing and later in a
published article. This is quite an important meeting. If I remember
correctly, it is only the third such meeting ever held in the history of
the People’s Republic of China. Premier Wen identified six areas in
finance in which special efforts are to be given in the period ahead.
One of these (the fifth) concerns the promotion of financial openness.
There he laid down clearly the need:
"To
continue to advance financial co-operation between the Mainland and Hong
Kong".
"To
further develop a mutual-assisting, complementary and inter-active
relationship between the two financial systems of the Mainland and Hong
Kong" and
"To
strengthen and promote the status and utility of Hong Kong as an
international financial centre."
6.
As far as I am aware, this is the first time the Central
People’s Government has been so specific about the relationship between
the two financial systems. And those are unambiguous words, at least in
what they say about the spirit of the co-operative relationship.
Mutual assistance means that where the need arises to address
shortcomings in the financial system, whether in supervision,
regulation, standards, technology, or whatever, there should be a
readiness on both sides to provide assistance. I will not bother you
with the details; suffice it to say that we in the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority spend a considerable amount of time providing assistance, in
training and in technical support, to our counterpart regulators on the
Mainland. We also benefit in turn from the skills and expertise of our
colleagues from the Mainland.
7.
A complementary relationship implies a willingness
to use the financial services provided by the other system when such
services are, for one reason or another, found lacking in the domestic
system. This enables the specialisation in the provision of financial
services where there is comparative advantage in their provision. The
consequence is greater efficiency in the use of scarce resources and
higher productivity. There will inevitably be some who are
disadvantaged for lack of comparative advantage. Their interests will
have to be taken into account in considering initiatives to strengthen
co-operation between the two financial systems. There will also, quite
understandably, be differences of opinion about how co-operation should
be pursued. These will have to be sympathetically appreciated, and
reforms patiently taken forward, although the public interest of
effective financial intermediation should always be of over-riding
importance.
8.
The inter-active relationship between the two
financial systems promises to be an important and interesting one, in
both the national and the international dimensions. At the national
dimension, if the two corresponding financial markets on the Mainland
and in Hong Kong, for example the equity markets, are suitably connected
and the investor base on the Mainland is able to interact with that in
Hong Kong, then clearly the China market, however one looks at it, will
be much bigger, possibly bigger than the sum of the two individual
markets. With a much larger investor base of a higher degree of
sophistication, benefiting from the presence of international investors,
there will be greater liquidity and the price discovery mechanism of the
market will be more efficient, thus making the equity market a more
attractive channel of financial intermediation. A bigger market also
reduces market concentration and the scope for market manipulation that
are, regrettably, common features of smaller financial markets. All
this will mean greater financial stability. On the international
dimension, an inter-active relationship between the two markets will
mean that domestic investors, and not just fund raisers, on the Mainland
will have more ready access to an international market in which to
invest their savings, achieving a higher rate of return, even after
adjusting for exchange-rate changes. Perhaps then consumers on the
Mainland will feel more comfortable about spending more money. This
would help lower the very high savings rate that now prevails on the
Mainland, achieve more balanced and sustainable economic growth, and
reduce the large balance of payments surplus that has become such a
political issue internationally.
9.
While these principles of co-operation between the two
financial systems and the theoretical benefits are simple and clear, the
devil is of course in the details. A strategy to take co-operation
forward will realistically have to take into account sensitivities
and relevant circumstances in both the Mainland and Hong Kong. For Hong
Kong it is a little easier, given the long history of market freedom.
Where there are rules and regulations they are designed to be
market-friendly and with clear objectives of upholding market integrity
and providing a measure of protection to depositors and investors. For
the Mainland it is more complicated, given the preponderance of controls
and therefore the invariable need to seek approvals from the relevant
authorities and to justify reform proposals. The invisible hand does
not work in so uninhibited a manner on the Mainland as in Hong Kong.
Even so, with the Mainland economy becoming more and more market
oriented, the rate of progress will naturally increase. What is
important is that, in tackling the devil when working out the details of
these special financial mobility channels between the two financial
systems, all concerned should be clear about what is in the best
long-term interest of the country.
10.
On these, there is comprehensive guidance, outlined
in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan approved by the People’s Congress in
March 2006. Chapter 33 of the Plan in particular deals with financial
reform. And as I mentioned earlier, there is also the National Finance
Working Meeting of January this year in which priority areas in
financial reform have been identified by Premier Wen. I will not bother
you with the details in these documents. What I would like to say here
is that, in response to the directions identified in these documents, we
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have recently developed a
strategy whereby the country can make greater use of the financial
system of Hong Kong in enhancing financial efficiency on the Mainland
while at the same time consolidate the status of Hong Kong as an
international financial centre in accordance with the Basic Law. Our
Chief Executive Mr Donald Tsang organised an economic summit last
year and tasked a Focus Group on Financial Services to map out our way
forward. The Report of the Focus Group, which contained a total of
eighty comprehensive proposals, was published in January this year.
11.
Having regard to the priorities of financial reform on the
Mainland, the Report articulated three roles that the financial system
of Hong Kong can and should play. The first role concerns
financial intermediation between the Mainland and the rest of the world.
The financial system of Hong Kong has been an important conduit for the
channelling of foreign savings to Mainland fund raisers. Indeed, in
recent years, insofar as the raising of funds through the equity market
is concerned, Hong Kong has become the largest funding source of
Mainland enterprises, surpassing London and New York. H-shares have
become so popular that international investors are now quite willing to
come to the stock market of Hong Kong to participate in an offer, rather
than expect Mainland enterprises to list shares in New York or other
financial centres. This is encouraging, and every effort is being made
to sustain this role of the stock market of Hong Kong as the premier
fund raising centre for Mainland enterprises.
12.
But meeting the financial challenges confronting the
Mainland now also requires attention to how domestic savings on the
Mainland might better be mobilised, including increasing their outward
mobility. Indeed, as convertibility for capital account items is
gradually implemented and the investment in foreign currency assets
overseas allowed, capital flows will become increasingly two-way. Hong
Kong is trying to open doors and create channels to facilitate the
outward mobility of capital from the Mainland, to position itself as the
first port of call, if not the final destination, for the
much-anticipated capital outflow that will come.
13.
The second role concerns assisting domestic
financial intermediation on the Mainland. Financial intermediation
on an international dimension, while important, is probably only a small
part of the financial activity needed to support the economy of the
Mainland. This is evidenced by the sheer size of that economy, its
relatively low degree of external orientation of the financial sector,
and its very high savings rate. The domestic financial intermediation
needs on the Mainland are enormous, and making domestic financial
intermediation more effective is a formidable challenge. With a
sophisticated financial system, Hong Kong is in a position to play a
large role in meeting this challenge.
14.
The third role is for Hong Kong to be the
laboratory for capital account convertibility of the RMB and the
increasing international use of the currency. The Mainland of China is
now the fourth largest economy and the third largest trading entity in
the world. In terms of the Asian region, it is the second largest
economy and the largest trading entity. The renminbi is attracting
increasing attention in international finance, although it still is not
a freely convertible currency. Indeed, the renminbi is now a popular
currency for the settlement of border trade in the southern part of
China. The declared policy of gradually achieving full and free
convertibility suggests the possibility of the renminbi, in the fullness
of time, achieving the status of an international currency and possibly
a reserve currency - even an anchor currency. Hong Kong is obviously
the ideal, free-market laboratory for conducting experiments in these
areas.
15.
Let me recapitulate before I go on. We have a good
understanding of the financial needs of China, as articulated in the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan of 2006 and the statements from the National
Finance Working Meeting earlier this year. We have, in this connection,
explored in detail the possible roles for the financial system of Hong
Kong in addressing these needs. There is also the ongoing, legal
requirement on the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an
international financial centre. What then should our strategy be
from a practical point of view?
16.
There are five key elements. The first is for us to
open doors on the Mainland to facilitate the expansion of presence
there by our financial institutions. With a savings rate of about 45%
and rapid economic growth, there is enormous demand for financial
services in China. Many of these services, especially the basic ones
like retail deposit taking and lending, need to be provided on
location. Hong Kong financial institutions are highly efficient and,
more importantly, their linguistic and cultural affinity with the
Mainland enable them to understand its financial needs – the services
needed and the credit-worthiness of fund raisers – much better than
institutions from overseas. They also have greater financial strength
than institutions from many other jurisdictions – I am talking about
capital adequacy here, not just the absolute amount of capital. We have
been working on removing or lowering the restrictions on ownership, on
management control and on the capital and other thresholds for
establishing a presence on the Mainland, whether in the form of branches
or subsidiaries. No doubt the Mainland authorities will want to manage
the impact of greater competition on domestic financial institutions.
This explains the gradual approach to relaxing restrictions that they
have taken up to now. But the benefits that competition will bring in
the transfer of know-how in areas like product development, risk
management, corporate governance and financial innovation are equally
obvious, not to mention the increase in efficiency that competition will
bring about. Entry restrictions are gradually being relaxed, although
obstacles remain in the form of controls on foreign ownership and limits
on the scope of business that can be undertaken. I believe that the
pace of relaxation could be increased quite considerably without
creating undue risks to the position of domestic institutions or to
financial stability.
17.
The
second
key element involves working with the Mainland authorities to increase
the outward mobility of Mainland investors and fund raisers, and
the associated funds, and of financial institutions and instruments.
The build-up of savings means that investors on the Mainland are in need
of investment opportunities. Allowing them to invest in Hong Kong would
offer them a wider range of instruments, including those issued by
Mainland fund raisers, thus completing the process of domestic financial
intermediation by making use of the advanced financial platform that
Hong Kong has and the Mainland lacks. Investors will also achieve
higher rates of risk-adjusted return, which will eventually stimulate
consumption and lower that very high savings rate, leading to more
sustainable growth for the Mainland economy. Greater mobility of
fund-raisers into Hong Kong will give them access to more diverse
sources of funds, again including Mainland funds. This is especially
important for the many that are credit-worthy but have experienced
difficulty raising funds through the Mainland’s underdeveloped financial
intermediation channels: the small and medium-sized private-sector
enterprises are good examples. At the same time, exposure to the
scrutiny of the free market in Hong Kong and to international standards
will force borrowers to become more efficient and transparent. Greater
mobility of Mainland financial intermediaries into Hong Kong will
similarly expose them to our free market and international practices,
which will in turn help them in the development of existing or new
international businesses. At the same time, Hong Kong will learn more
about Mainland needs and practices. The high level of co-operation
between Hong Kong and Mainland regulators that has developed in recent
years will allow us to ensure effective supervision of these
intermediaries, in much the same way as already happens with other
jurisdictions.
18.
The third element of our strategy is to develop
channels whereby Hong Kong financial instruments, including the
H-shares issued by Mainland enterprises in Hong Kong, are made available
to investors on the Mainland. This would help satisfy investor demand
on the Mainland and, inasmuch as many of these instruments are issued by
Mainland fund raisers, it would again contribute to domestic financial
intermediation through the use of the financial system of Hong Kong. It
would also help to address the concerns of some on the Mainland that the
best Mainland assets are being marketed to foreigners through H-share
IPOs in Hong Kong instead of being made available to Mainland
investors. These financial instruments could be traded on Mainland
stock exchanges, in the inter-bank market or over the counter. They
could take the form of simple derivative products of the underlying
securities in Hong Kong, for example depository receipts certifying the
holding in trust of those assets. There are of course technical issues
involved in this type of schemes: these include the need to ensure that
the derivative products and the underlying securities are convertible;
the need to ensure price equalisation between them; and the treatment of
the associated foreign currency transactions. But none of these issues
is too difficult to resolve. We are working on and exploring with the
Mainland authorities on some specific proposals. I am hopeful of
positive results.
19.
The fourth element of our strategy is to strengthen
Hong Kong’s ability to handle financial transactions denominated in
the renminbi, very much in anticipation of the rising role of the
renminbi as an international currency. If Mainland investors and fund
raisers are to be brought together in the financial system of Hong Kong,
there may come a time when the preferred currency denomination for
financial intermediation becomes the renminbi rather than the Hong Kong
dollar, in order to avoid foreign exchange risk. As I argued earlier,
it is essential that Hong Kong should develop its ability to facilitate
financial transactions denominated in the renminbi, as indeed we
currently possess the financial infrastructure to facilitate financial
transactions denominated in the US dollar and the euro and of course the
Hong Kong dollar as well. I am talking about, for example,
state-of-the-art, real-time gross settlement payment systems, which
achieve payment versus payment, and finality of settlement in our time
zone without settlement risks. We have just extended this sophisticated
financial infrastructure to include the renminbi, in anticipation of the
development of a renminbi debt market in Hong Kong – a matter that has
just received the go-ahead from the Mainland authorities. In fact, we
made a start in developing this renminbi capability of our financial
system back in 2004, experimenting with a modest scope of banking
business in renminbi, including the taking of renminbi deposits, foreign
exchange transactions, remittances and credit cards. We have gained
valuable experience from this and are ready to expand the scope, pending
the green light from the Mainland authorities on quite a number of
proposals now on the table, including for example the use of the
renminbi in trade finance and settlement between the Mainland and Hong
Kong.
20.
The fifth element of our strategy is to strengthen
linkages of the financial infrastructures of the Mainland and
Hong Kong. I have mentioned a few times the need to enhance the
mobility of the funds of investors and fund raisers, the mobility of
financial instruments and financial institutions between the two
financial systems, through modifications of policies and relaxation of
controls. There is of course a need to make sure that the financial
traffic is safe and efficient, just as we need to ensure that the land,
sea and air traffic for our citizens is safe and efficient, and this
means effective linkages of the financial infrastructures of the
Mainland and Hong Kong. There is also scope for specialisation in the
provision of financial infrastructural services. Hong Kong already has
a world-class, multi-currency financial infrastructure that can cater
for most of the Mainland’s payment and settlement needs. There are
already a number of links between our systems and the Mainland’s, so it
makes sense, on cost and efficiency grounds, for the Mainland to make
more use of our foreign-currency payment systems to settle its
foreign-currency transactions in Hong Kong or to access other
international payment systems through Hong Kong. Better links will also
help proper monitoring and management of risks. And beyond linkages of
payment and settlement systems, there are the all-important market
linkages that should be explored, notably the possible linkage between
the stock exchanges in Hong Kong and Shanghai, not only for market
efficiency purposes that I mentioned earlier when talking about the
inter-active relationship between the two financial systems, but also
for competitive purposes vis-à-vis developed overseas markets in New
York, London and indeed here in Tokyo.
21.
In conclusion, I think you will agree that this is
an ambitious strategy. There is no doubt that it will mean breaking new
ground in a number of areas, both for Hong Kong and the Mainland. There
are bound to be those who, understandably, worry about their established
businesses and operations and how they will be affected by shifts in
liquidity and where business is carried out. I firmly believe, however,
that the specific proposals falling within the five elements of the
strategy will benefit China as a whole, and will specifically benefit
the Mainland in its financial development and Hong Kong in the
maintenance of its status as an international financial centre. And,
sustainable and rapid economic growth of China, well served by the two
financial systems in co-operation, will benefit our neighbours in the
region and the global economy. For, although I have focused almost
entirely on the relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland of China
during this talk – as befits the occasion – the processes have a
regional and a global dimension. As an international city, Hong Kong is
the home and place of business of many people from around the world. Not
least among them is the very large and settled Japanese community, whose
members have played an important part in developing Hong Kong’s
strengths as a financial centre. The strategy I have described will
provide still greater opportunities for international participation in
Hong Kong’s finance and trade, and I warmly encourage you all to come
and make the most of them. Seeing the strategy through to fruition will
take time, and there will be setbacks along the way – there always are.
But China’s integration into the global economy is inevitable and will
benefit us all. Hong Kong can and will make an important contribution.
22.
Thank you.
|