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Our Ref.: B1/15C
B9/29C
13 July 2009
The Chief Executive
All Authorized Institutions offering Internet banking services
Dear
Sir/Madam,
Strengthening Security Controls for Internet Banking
Services
In the
light of recent Internet banking fraud cases reported locally and overseas,
I am writing to require authorized institutions (AIs) to step up the
security controls over their Internet banking services provided to both
retail and corporate customers.
The
recent fraudulent technique adopted by fraudsters is believed to involve
infecting the customer's personal computer (PC) with Trojan horse programs1(Trojan)
to hijack the Internet banking login credentials of customers during the
Internet banking login process. It is believed that when customers attempt
to login to the genuine bank's website, the Trojan intercepts the process at
the customers' PCs and displays a fake or modified login screen requesting
for their login ID and password as well as the one-time password (OTP)2for
two-factor authentication. The captured login credentials by the Trojan
were transmitted to and then used by the fraudsters almost simultaneously at
a remote location to login the victims’ Internet banking account for
conducting high-risk Internet banking transactions, including registering a
third-party payee account or making fund transfer to an unregistered
third-party account. Fortunately, most of the unauthorised attempts have
been detected and/or stopped by the customers or the AIs concerned.
Although
the use of OTP for two factor authentication is still recognised as an
effective security measure for Internet banking services, adequate
protection of the OTP is essential for ensuring continuing effectiveness of
two factor authentication. In this connection, AIs are required to
implement, where applicable, the security measures set out in the
Annex if these measures have not yet been put in
place. In addition, the HKMA expects AIs to complete the implementation of
these security measures before the end of September 2009. Should AIs find
it difficult to complete the implementation within the aforesaid period,
they should discuss their timetable with the HKMA individually through their
usual contact of the HKMA.
Meanwhile, AIs should step up their online fraud monitoring and reporting
mechanism before the above security measures are fully implemented. Where
necessary, AIs should verify with their customers on any suspicious and
unusual transactions, particularly fund transfers to overseas bank
accounts. The HKMA will continue to work with the Hong Kong Police Force
and the banking industry to monitor the latest technological developments
and trends of Internet banking frauds and to consider other possible
preventive and detective measures if required.
If you have any
questions on this letter, please feel free to contact Mr Nelson Chow at
2878-1470.
Yours faithfully,
Nelson Man
Executive Director
(Banking Supervision)
Annex
Recommended measures to strengthen Internet banking security
Protection of OTPs and customer alerts
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AIs
should ensure that the OTPs used for logging into Internet banking
and/or authenticating online high-risk transaction should expire within
a short period of time. In general, the period of validity of such OTPs
should not exceed 100 seconds and each online high-risk transaction
should require a different OTP.
-
With
respect to the SMS message containing the OTP, AIs should ensure that
the details of the transaction are prominently displayed before the OTP,
including among others, the transaction type, partial payee account
number and transaction amount if relevant. Customer should be reminded
to review the accuracy of the transaction details prior to entering the
OTP to initiate online high-risk transactions.
-
AIs
should notify customers immediately via an effective alternative channel
(e.g. SMS message) after completing an online high-risk transaction such
as registering a third-party payee account and transferring fund to an
unregistered third-party account. The notification message should
contain the transaction details, including among others, the transaction
type, partial payee account number, and transaction amount if relevant.
-
Customers, who choose not to adopt the above notification scheme, should
be restricted from using online high-risk transaction facilities. Such
customers will need to register third-party accounts and/or increase the
transaction limits at bank branches or by post before they can conduct
any online fund transfers or bill payments to these accounts.
Digital
certificate security
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If
digital certificate is adopted for two factor authentication, AIs should
ensure that the digital certificate and its associated private key is
non-duplicable and stored in a secure media (e.g. a smart card).
Customers should be reminded to remove the media storing the digital
certificate from their PCs after use.
Controls over fund transfers
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The
default transaction limit for online fund transfers to unregistered
third-party accounts (including both local and overseas payees) should
be set to zero when a new Internet banking account is first activated.
Customers should only be allowed to increase the transaction limit
through secure channels (e.g. at branches or by post) with adequate
identity checks conducted by AIs.
-
The
service for online fund transfers to unregistered third-party accounts
should be disabled or the relevant transaction limit should be reset to
zero if such a facility has not been used for a prolonged period, say
one year.
Monitoring of unusual activities
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AIs
should have a robust and an effective automated fraud monitoring
mechanism in place to detect, in a timely manner, suspicious online
transactions and unusual activities based on predefined rules and
criteria (e.g. transactions initiated from an Internet Protocol (IP)
address3different from the one usually used
by the customer, fund transfers which have not been done before or fund
transfers of amount up to the maximum allowable transaction limit of the
customer account).
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Formal incident reporting and management procedures should be put in
place to handle detected suspicious and unusual online transactions.
For instance, AIs should, as soon as practicable, check with the
customers of such transactions or activities before effecting the
transactions. AIs should also keep the HKMA apprised immediately of any
suspected or confirmed fraud cases relating to Internet banking.
Customer education
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AIs
should regularly review the security advice to ensure that it remains
adequate and appropriate taking into account the latest developments of
Internet banking security and fraudulent techniques.
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AIs
should pay special attention to the provision of easy-to-understand and
prominent advice to customers on Internet banking precautions, in
particular, advising the customers to ensure that their PCs are securely
configured and that they are adequately protected from computer viruses
and malicious programs.
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Customers should be reminded to provide a valid mobile phone and contact
numbers for notification purpose and notify the AI timely if any of
these numbers are changed.
1 A Trojan horse is a computer
program in which a harmful code is contained inside an apparently harmless
program. Trojan horses can infect a PC in circumstances such as when the
attacker exploits the vulnerabilities of certain operating systems, and the
victim opens contaminated e-mail attachments or visits malicious websites.
Trojan horses can be used to capture screen displays and keystrokes, to
steal information stored in, or to take over the control of, victims' PCs.
2 A one-time password for
two-factor authentication is typically generated by a security device (e.g.
a security token) given by the bank or contained in a short message service
(SMS) message sent by the bank.
3 An "IP address" is a numerical
identification and logical address that is assigned to each computer on the
Internet. A computer's IP address may be permanently assigned or supplied
each time that it connects to the Internet by an Internet service provider.

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