LCQ19: Fire incident at MTR train and public transport safety
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Question:
On the 10th of last month, the MTR Tsuen Wan Line experienced the most serious alleged arson incident in 38 years since its commissioning. That incident caused injuries to 10-odd persons, with several of them in serious or critical conditions. That incident has aroused public concern about whether proper contingency plans for handling unexpected incidents in large-scale transport systems have been put in place, and whether passengers can obtain sufficient information in a timely manner. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) given that the MTR South Island Line is plied by unmanned trains and some MTR stations (including some stations on the South Island Line and the Kwun Tong Line Extension) have no MTR staff on duty on the platforms, of the current contingency plans formulated by the relevant government departments for handling unexpected incidents which occur on such kind of trains and in such kind of stations;
(2) whether it has assessed if the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) had disseminated sufficient information to passengers in a timely manner during the aforesaid incident;
(3) whether it knows if MTRCL has, in the light of the aforesaid incident, formulated additional contingency measures for handling unexpected incidents; if MTRCL has, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
(4) how far MTRCL staff participated in large-scale emergency drills conducted by government departments in the past two years; whether duty officers of MTR stations and train captains participated in such emergency drills; if not, whether drills involving such MTR staff members will be arranged in the near future; and
(5) whether it has considered setting up an independent committee to review the contingency plans (including the arrangement for the timely dissemination of information to passengers) for handling unexpected incidents in large-scale transport systems; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?
Reply:
President,
On the night of February 10, 2017, a passenger was alleged to have started a fire on a Tsuen Wan Line train running from Admiralty Station to Tsim Sha Tsui (TST) Station. A total of 19 passengers were injured or felt unwell.
The train captain, having received the alert of the emergency button pulled by passengers at 7.11pm and felt smoke, made a report to the Operation Control Centre (OCC) right away. The staff of the OCC instantly requested the staff of TST Station to make preparation at the platform and inform the Police and the Fire Services Department (FSD). Within five minutes after the train concerned arrived at the TST Station at 7.14pm, the MTR staff evacuated more than 1 000 passengers on the train and the platform, called for ambulance assistance for injured passengers and put out the fire together with the passengers. The Police and FSD personnel arrived at the scene within two minutes and four minutes respectively after the train had arrived at the platform. At that time, the situation at the scene had basically stabilised. Within a brief several minutes, Police and rescue personnel, and MTR staff arrived at the scene to provide emergency services and put things under control, meeting the design and requirements of contingency plans.
Railway is the backbone of the public transport network of Hong Kong. Over 5 million passenger trips are made on the MTR every day. Railway safety should be of prime importance. Although unexpected incidents or improper behaviour of individual person is difficult to prevent, there are adequate facilities and emergency arrangements in the MTR system to handle various types of incidents.
My reply to the various parts of the Hon Wu Chi-wai's question is as follows.
(1) and (3) The MTRCL has all along put in place operational and safety manuals, covering the contingency arrangements for various incidents (including fire and flooding). The MTRCL has to consult Government departments in formulation of these manuals. These manuals are applicable to all railway lines, including fully automatic operation (FAO) trains. All MTR staff should be conversant with these safety manuals and contingency procedures. In the unfortunate event of an incident, the MTR staff will activate the relevant contingency procedures in the manuals depending on the nature and severity of the incident. The train captain and station staff will maintain close communication with the OCC while the staff of the OCC will coordinate response actions. Where warranted, train service will be adjusted and additional staff deployed to affected stations to assist passengers. The MTRCL will inform the relevant Government departments as soon as possible, including the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD) and the Transport Department (TD). If railway services are disrupted, the Corporation will handle the properly in accordance with established contingency plan (see Annex). For the alleged arson incident in question, the MTR staff have acted in accordance with safety manuals and contingency procedures.
The FAO trains have emergency communication system installed inside the train cars which connect directly to the OCC. In the event of an emergency, passengers can contact the OCC directly so that MTR staff may provide assistance as soon as possible. During its early stage of commissioning, a MTRCL staff is currently deployed to assume duty in the FAO trains of the South Island Line.
(2) The MTRCL has been making use of various channels, including broadcasts at stations and in trains, passenger information display panels, MTR website and smartphone application "Traffic News", to disseminate train service information, including the occurrence of any emergency incidents. When fire broke out on train on the night of February 10, 2017, the train captain made broadcasts before arriving at the TST station, advising passengers to leave the train immediately upon arrival at the station. There were also broadcasts at the TST Station immediately upon the arrival of the train, that the train would not take on passengers. Within minutes after the arrival of the train, the station staff released information to passengers through broadcasts and passenger information display panels about the occurrence of an emergency. Staff on duty in the concourse and platform also instructed passengers to evacuate from the station. At the same time, the MTRCL released train service message through smartphone application, advising passengers that an emergency occurred in TST Station and that the trains would not stop at that station.
(4) At present, the MTRCL arranges regular training for staff and conducts 12-15 drills with the Police and the FSD jointly every year. Emergencies and major incidents were simulated to test evacuation and emergency response procedures. Practices and training are conducted repeatedly so that staff become conversant with the details of response procedures and how to implement them. The last major drill was conducted in November 2016 (about three months ago) and participated by about 2 000 persons, including MTR station staff, train captains and members of the public (simulating as passengers). The Government and the MTRCL will both enhance and increase the frequency of drills, in the light of the alleged arson case in question.
(5) As evidenced by the speed and results of the response action for the alleged arson case, the above-mentioned established emergency procedures was successfully activated and achieved its effectiveness. In view of the seriousness of the incident, the MTRCL has set up a high-level committee (with participation of external consultants) to conduct a full investigation and review of the incident. The areas to be covered include safety equipment and response procedures of the station and train car, whether the staff have effectively carried out the established procedures, the timeliness and effectiveness of service recovery, whether the information to passengers was disseminated properly, as well as further improvement measures. The MTRCL will submit a report to EMSD upon the completion of the investigation. EMSD, in conjunction with other departments such as FSD and the Police, will examine the report and follow up on the implementation of improvement measures proposed by the MTRCL. The finalised report will be made public.
The franchised bus is the major road-based public transport mode. Currently, all fire-fighting equipment and escape facilities on franchised bus compartment shall comply with the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374). The bus compartment is constructed of fire-retardant materials, and there is fire barrier between the bus compartment and engine bay. The bus compartment is equipped with fire extinguisher, emergency exits, and break-glass hammers. Signs are also put up in the bus compartment to direct passengers how to open the emergency exits or use the break-glass hammer to break the glass to escape in case of incidents. TD and the franchised bus companies will regularly inspect the equipment to ensure they are maintained in proper working order and condition. On the other hand, all franchised bus companies have issued guidelines to bus captains on ways to handle fire incidents and evacuate passengers. Drills will be carried out for new recruits and during on-the-job-training of bus captains. The bus companies will timely review the guidelines and training programme.
After the alleged MTR arson case, TD and EMSD will also review, in conjunction with relevant departments, safety measures undertaken by other public transport operators. The review will examine existing fire-fighting and escape equipment provided by operators, contingency plans, staff training and drills, so as to evaluate the need for improvements.
Ends/Wednesday, March 1, 2017
Issued at HKT 16:30
Issued at HKT 16:30
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